Torts - Malicious Prosecution - The Requirement of Special Injury by Heinley, Robert C
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 31 Number 3 Article 3 
1955 
Torts - Malicious Prosecution - The Requirement of Special Injury 
Robert C. Heinley 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Heinley, Robert C. (1955) "Torts - Malicious Prosecution - The Requirement of Special Injury," North Dakota 
Law Review: Vol. 31 : No. 3 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol31/iss3/3 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
NOTES
by legal restrictions. What it does mean is that in the absence of
conduct so unreasonable as to be almost entirely without any con-
ceivable justification, an irate debtor will find expenditure of funds
in satisfaction of his obligation to be a more rewarding investment
than prosecution of a law suit against his overzealous creditor.
H. M. PIPPIN.
TORTS-MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-THE REQUIREMENT OF SPECIAL
INJURY.-The action of malicious prosecution is a specific tort,
classified by Cooley as a wrong affecting personal security.1 A
cause of action for malicious prosecution is based on breach of
that legal duty which every man owes to another to refrain frorn
instituting proceedings when malice is present and he has no
probable cause to justify his action. It has been stated that such a
prosecution is one that is begun in malice, without probable cause
to believe it can succeed, and which finally ends in failure.2 The
action of malicious prosecution has been referred to as one not
favored by the law3 but it is agreed that when the requisite ele-
ments exist the action will lie.
The elements of an action for malicious prosecution are: (1)
the commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil
judicial proceeding by the present defendant against the present
plaintiff; (2) its bona fide termination in favor of the present
plaintiff; (3) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding;
(4) the presence of malice; and, (5) damage resulting to the pres-
ent plaintiff.' The burden is upon the plaintiff to show the con-
current existance of these requirements.
The question of the quantum of damage the plaintiff must suf-
fer when the action is founded on the malicious prosecution of a
civil suitV is a perplexing one. One view is that an action will not
lie unless there has been an arrest of the person, seizure of prop-
erty or other special injury which would not necessarily result in
all suits prosecuted to recover for like causes of action.°
1. Cooley, Torts 381 (4th Ed. 1932).
2. See Burt v. Smith, 181 N. Y. 1, 73 N.E. 495, 496 (1905); Kunz v. Johnson, 74
S. D. 577, 57 N.W.2d 116, 119 (1953).
3. See, e.g., Ball v. Rewles, 93 Cal. 222, 28 Pac. 937, 938 (1892); Alexander v.
Petty, 108 A.2d 575, 577 (Del. 1954); Davis v. Brady, 218 Ky. 384, 291 S.W. 412
(1927); North Point Construction Co. v. Sagner, 185 Md. 200, 44 A.2d 441, 444 (1945).
4. See Turner v. J. Black & Sons, 242 Ala. 127, 5 So.2d 93, 94 (1941); Kunz v.
Johnson, supra note 2 at 118.
5. The discussion of damage herein is confined to damage arising from the prosecu-
tion of a civil suit. The conflict concerning quantum of damage is not present when the
-suit complained of was a criminal action.
6. See, e.g., Counihan v. Ferrell, 89 Ga. 795, 81 S.E.2d 215 (1954); Schwartz v.
Schwartz, 285 Il. App. 560, 2 N.E.2d 751 (1936), affirmed, 366 I1. 247, 8 N.E.2d
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The case of Aalfs v. Aalfs,7 a suit for malicious prosecution,
arose out of an action for recission of a contract of sale of an
interest in a business. Plaintiff alleged damage consisting of im-
paired credit, a clouded title, impaired saleability of property;
damaged reputation, humiliation and expenses of defense. The
court held that these were incidents which would attach to any
suit for recission of a contract of sale, and that such elements of
damage did not constitute the requisite special injury to maintain
the action. Courts adopting this view contend that such damages
are but the uncompensated burdens of litigation for which the
action of malicious prosecution will not lie.8 A right of action has
been found to exist where a partner was deprived of his property
due to the appointment of a receiver over partnership property;"
where assets were tied up by the malicious institution of bank-
ruptcy proceedings;"0 where a party was arrested and held to bail
in civil process;'- and where there were unfounded proceedings in
forcible entry and detainer. 12 Such incidents of damage are thought
to constitute special injury.
The opposite view, taken by a seemingly equal number of
courts, is that an action will lie for the institution of a civil action
maliciously brought without probable cause even though there
has been no interference with the person or property of the de-
fendant in the original suit and no special injury is shown."3 The
rationale behind this theory is that one who maliciously sets in
motion the formidable machinery of the courts to the oppression
and harassment of his neighbor, abuses the process of the law in-
tended for parties who act in good faith. His offense is of the
same character as that of one who accompanies such an action
with the seizure of the person or the property of the defendant,
but of a lesser degree.' 4 These courts advance the common law
maxim that for every wrong the law furnishes a remedy, and argue
668 (1937); Smith v. Michigan Buggy Co., 175 Ill. 619, 51 N.E. 569 (1898); Wet-
more v. Mellinger, 64 Iowa 741, 18 N.W. 870 (1884); Cabakov v. Thatcher, 27 N. J.
Super. 404, 99 A.2d 548 (1953); Johnson v. Walker Smith Co., 47 N.M. 310, 142 P.2d
546 (1943).
7. 66 N.W.2d 121 (Iowa 1954).
8. Johnson v. Walker Smith Co., supra note 6.
9. Luby v. Bennet, Ill Wis. 613, 87 N.W. 804 (1901).
10. Norin v. Scheldt Mfg. Co., 220 Ill. 521, 130 N.E. 791 (1921).
11. Cardival v. Smith, 109 Mass, 158, 12 Am. Rep. 682 (1872).
12. Pope v. Pollock, 46 Ohio St. 367, 21 N.E. 356 (1889).
13. Turner v. J. Black & Sons, 242 Ala. 127, 5 So.2d 93 (1941); Peerson v. Ash-
craft Cotton Mills, 201 Ala. 348, 78 So. 204 (1918); Ackerman v. Kaufman, 41 Ariz.
110, 15 P.2d 966 (1932); Easton v. Bank of Stockton 66 Cal. 123, 4 Pac. 1106 (1884);
McCormick Machinery Co. v. tWilliam, 63 Neb. 391, 88 NW. 497 (1901); Kolka v.
Johes, 6 N. D. 461, 71 N.W. 558 (1897).
14. See Lipscomb v. Shofner. 96 Tenn. 112, 33 S.W. 818, 819 (1896).
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that to refuse the action in the absence of special damage would
be to violate this well recognized principle. If an individual has
prostituted judicial process to gratify personal malice, the courts
should afford the party wronged redress for the damage sustained
by him.'
The courts that require special injury reason that there should
be no restraint upon the original suitor through fear of liability
which may arise from failure in his action. He should not ordinarily
be subject to a suit for bringing an action, and be required to de-
fend against the charge of malice and the want of probable cause.-
Advocates of the special injury criterion maintain that in a civil
action the measure of damages of a successful defendant is statu-
tory costs however inadequate they may be.I These courts claim
support for their position from the fact that by the Statute of Marl-
bridge,," the English courts abolished the cause of action for
damages for the malicious prosecution of civil suit.
In the leading North Dakota case of Kolka v. Jones,19 the judge
had this to say in commenting on the arguments of courts in this
country claiming support from the English rule:-
"Ignoring the differences between the phraseology and
manifest purpose of the statutes regulating costs in this country,
and the letter and obvious spirit of the Statute of Marlbridge,
the assertion is not infrequently made that costs afford full
indemnity, though the suit be instituted without probable
cause, and prosecuted in a spirit of malice. To our minds this
argument does not rise to the dignity of sophistry. The claim
that the payment of statutory costs will in all cases or even in
any case make amends for the damage inflicted by the mali-
cious prosecution of a civil suit is palpably false... Subsequent
legislation in England shows that the Statute of Marlbridge
was enacted, not as a general law regulating costs, but to afford
a summary remedy to the-successful defendant in place of the
existing cause of action to recover his damages on account of
15. See Ackerman v. Kaufman, 41 Ariz. 110, 15 P.2d 966, 967 (1932); Closson v.
Staples, 42 Vt. 209, 1 Am. Rep. 316 (1869).
16. See, e.g., Smith v. Michigan Buggy Co., 175 I1. 619, 51 N.W. 569, 571 (1898);
Aalfs v. Aalfs, 66 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Iowa 1954).
17. See Muldoon v. Rickey, 103 Pa. St: 110 (1883). Cf. Smith v. Michigan Buggy Co.,
note 16 supra at 571, "'It is urged that the costs which are awarded to the successful de-
fendant in a civil suit, malicious in its character, and brought against him without prob-
able cause, are inadequate compensation for the injury which he suffers. But the question
of the amount of costs which are to be allowed the successful party is a question to be
determined by the legislature, and not by the courts.!'
18. See Myre v. Hessey, 242 Wis. 638, 9 N.W.2d 106 (1943) at 110: "The only
reference to malicious prosecution that we find in the statute is in Par. II of c. VI thereof,
pp. 60, Vol. 1, English Stats. at Large, where the English translation given reads as follow:s
'And if any chief lords do maliciously implead such feofees, faining his case, namely,
where the feoffments were made lawfully and in good faith, then the feofees shall have
their damages awarded and their costs which they have sustained by occasion of the
foresaid plea, and the plaintiffs shall be grievously punished by americiament.'
19. 6 N. D. 461, 71 N.W. 558 (1897).
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the malicious prosecution of a civil action against him . . .
The act of the British parliment which Was held to have taken
away the existing cause of action for damages for the malicious
prosecution of a civil stit was an act which in terms was limited
to cases of that kind; and when it is remembered that it gave
the defendant not merely costs, but also his damages, it is
obvious that the statute was framed to give the successful
defendant his remedy in the very case in which he was malic-
iously prosecuted, instead of compelling him to seek redress in
an independent action. The Statute of Marlbridge was limited
to civil actions maliciously prosecuted, and gave the defendant
the damages he had suffered because of such perversion of the
forms and remedies of the law, whereas the statutes regulating
costs on this side of the water are not restricted to actions in
which the motive promoting the litigation was unjustifiable, but
are intended to apply to all cases, to the end that some indem-
nity to the other suitor may be afforded in every case, inde-
pendently of the state of mind of the person bringing the suit,
on the question whether he had reasonable ground :lor believing
that the action could be maintained; leaving the remedy for a
perversion of legal machinery to the common law maxim that
for every wrong the law will give legal redress."20
Another argument advanced in favor of the requirement of
special damage is that the application of the reasoning behind the
privilege extending to defamatory matter contained in pleadings
leads to the conclusion that the instituting of civil proceedings
should be similarly privileged unless special injury results.- The
dissenting opinion in the very case in which this argument was ad-
vanced, countered with these persuasive words: ". . . [B]ecause
one is privileged to libel another in an action brought to secure
adjudication of a claim he should not be privileged to maliciously
injure another when the entire action is maliciously brought for a
purpose other than securing adjudication of the stated claim."12
A more common contention of courts requiring special injury is
that to permit the action would be to promote litigation and en-
courage successive suits, thus clogging the channels of litigation.2"
The theory is that a successful defendant would be tempted to
bring another suit to recover for the damages resulting from his
prosecution of the first suit which he had won. 4 Thus it is said
if A sues B and loses, he might be subjected to a return suit based
20. Id. at 463, 71 N.W. at 560. See also Ackerman v. Kaufman, 41 Ariz. 110, 15
P.2d 966 (1932).
21. See Aalfs v. Aalfs, 66 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Iowa 1954).
22. Id. at 128.
23. See, e.g., Wetmore v. Mellinger, 64 Iowa 741, 18 N.W. 870, 871 (1884); Abbot
v. Thorne, 34 Wash. 692, 76 Pac. 302, 303 (1904); Myhre v. Hessey, 242 Wis. 638, 9
N.W.2d 106, 110 (1943).
24. See Smith v. Michigan Buggy Co., 175 Il1. 619, 51 N.E. 569, 571 (1898).
NOTES
on alleged malice in bringing the first action. But if B should fail
in his suit for malicious prosecution, A might then bring his own
action in turn, alleging malice and want of probable cause in B's
suit, thus producing an endless chain of actions.25
The proponents of the contrary view point out that the fears
of a multiplicity of suits have not been realized in those jurisdic-
tions allowing the action in the absence of special injury.2  Such
fears have little foundation, as the party who has sustained the
burden of one action will be unlikely to assume so quickly the ex-
pense of a second suit unless he is reasonable assured of success.
2
7
The courts adopting the requirement of special injury to main-
tain an action for malicious prosecution based on a civil suit con-
strue the bringing of two or more successive suits on the same
alleged cause of action to be special injury for which the action
will lie.2' Courts- construing successive suits to be special injury
for which the action will lie point out that the right to litigate is
not the right to become a nuisance. 29 Again it would seem that the
offense is of the same character but only lesser in degree. In some
jurisdictions the courts partially subvert the requirement of special
injury by liberally construing that requirement."0 For example, it
has been held that the prosecution of an appeal as part of the
maliciously insituted action gave rise to special injury."'
The two widely divergent views on the requirement of special
injury point out the need of striking some sort of balance between
the prevention of unconscionable suits and permitting honest as-
sertion of supposed rights.
ROBERT C. HEINLEY.
25. See Aalfs v. Aalfs, supra note 21 at 124.
26. See Kolka v. Jones, 6 N. D. 461, 71 N.W. 558, .561 (1897).
27. Ibid.
28. See Soffos v. Eaton, 152 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Shedd v. Patterson, 302 Il1.
355, 134 N.E. 705 (1922).
29. See Melvin v. Pence, 130 F.2d 423, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
30. See Peterson v. Peregoy & Co., 180 Iowa 325, 163 N.W. 224, 226 (1917); Holt
v. Boyle Bros. Inc., 217 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
31. See Soffos v. Eaton, supra note .28.
